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ABSTRACT 
The Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is leading 
NASA's efforts to develop the next U.S. capability for 
crew transportation and rescue services to and from the 
International Space Station (ISS) by the mid-decade 
timeframe. The outcome of this capability is expected 
to stimulate and expand ·the U.S. space transportation 
industry. NASA is relying on its decades of human 
space flight experience to certify U.S. crewed vehicles 
to the ISS and is doing so in a two phase certification 
approach. NASA Certification will cover all aspects of 
a crew transportation system, including development, 
test, evaluation, and verification; program management 
and control; flight readiness certification; launch, 
landing, recovery, and mission operations; sustaining 
engineering and maintenance/upgrades. To ensure 
NASA crew safety, NASA Certification will validate 
technical and performance requirements, verify 
compliance with NASA requirements, validate the crew 
transportation system operates in appropriate 
environments, and quantify residual risks. 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Objective of this Paper 
The objective of this paper is to define the framework 
for Certification of a commercially-provided 
transportation system to carry NASA crew to and from 
the ISS. A certification approach is needed that will 
allow CCP to work closely with the Commercial 
Provider (Provider) in order to efficiently and 
effectively focus CCP resources on certification 
completion, and minimize the duplication of effort and 
safety critical forward work late in the design cycle. 
This paper outlines a framework for Certification that is 
independent of the acquisition process and contains 
overarching guidance for the CCP team. 
1.2 Framework for Certification of Commercial 
Crew System 
In general, Certification is the confmnation that critical 
characteristics of an object or system have been 
achieved. Crew Transportation System (CTS) 
Certification is the documented authorization granted 
by the NASA Associate Administrator (AA) that allows 
the use of the CTS to transport NASA crew. The focus 
of this paper is Certification of the CTS for use in 
transporting NASA crew in accordance with the ISS 
'" 
Design Reference Mission (DRM). The verification of 
these requirements is an essential focus of the CTS 
Certification. As shown in Figure 1.1 , CTS Certification 
consists of three elements: design, production, and 
operations Certification. NASA will review and 
approve the Provider's Certification plan which 
explains how the Provider intends to achieve 
Certification of their CTS. Where NASA finds that their 
requirements are not contained in the Provider's 
Certification Plan, or planned verifications of 
requirements are not rigorous enough to meet 
Certification, NASA will reserve approval of the plan 
until the gaps are resolved to an acceptable level of risk. 
After NASA approves the Certification plan, the 
Provider will execute the plan, and generate the data 
required to confmn that the CTS meets NASA' s 
requirements. 
Certification of each of these is described as a three step 
process: 
l) The Provider develops a CTS that they assert meets 
NASA' s safety, crew, and technical requirements 
and is managed to an acceptable level of risk for 
transporting NASA crew. 
2) NASA substantiates the Provider's assertion. 
3) NASA grants Certification. 
This is a complex and iterative process that requires 
considerable effort on the part of both NASA and the 
Provider. To support this effort, the Provider will 
provide access to the facilities, products, data, and 
models necessary for NASA to substantiate their 
assertion of certification. Provider certification 
activities and NASA review should be concurrent to the 
greatest extent possible. 
An interim Certification will be granted by NASA prior 
to the first low Earth orbit (LEO) crewed flight, whether 
crewed by NASA or the Provider, upon successful 
completion of a Design Certification Review (DCR). 
The DCR will formally document the configuration 
baseline and the conditions under which the system is 
certified, the verification of the system, as well as the 
baselined risks. A delta DCR may be necessary to 
review completion of residual open work from the DCR 
before full Certification for the ISS DRM is granted. 
Upon successful completion of the crewed flight test 
phase, an Operational Readiness Review (ORR) will be 
conducted by the Provider. The ORR is a key part of 
CTS Certification for the operational ISS transportation 
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missions. It occurs once during the program life cycle 
(or at the introduction of new or significantly modified 
systems/facilities) and marks a transition time from a 
design, development, and test phase to an operational 
phase where the CTS is expected to perform standard 
crew transportation services missions to the ISS. 
With successful completion of OCR (and any delta 
DCRs) and the ORR, the CCP will conduct a 
certification review to determine that the CTS can 
safely transport crew to and from the ISS and that the 
CTS can meet the DRM for which it was developed. 
The baseline configuration of the hardware, software 
and processes used in design, production and operations 
will be documented and maintained by the Provider. 
Certification maintenance will be performed for all 
crewed flights. It ensures that new understanding of 
hazards/risks, modifications to design, production, and 
operations which could violate the CTS Certification 
are understood and accepted prior to subsequent flights. 
NASA will evaluate and grant Certification addendums 
for any modifications to the design, production and 
operations that invalidate the CTS Certification or 
determine the need for re-Certification. 
Figure I: Elements of CTS Certification. 
2. CTS CERTIFICATION 
While Certification is discussed in terms of design, 
production and operations throughout this document, it 
should be noted that multiple certifications are not 
performed or granted for a single mission. As the CTS 
design matures, the primary focus of the Providers and 
NASA will shift from design to production, and then to 
operations, and portions of these elements are executed 
concurrently. 
Broken down into fundamental elements, the design 
portion of certification encompasses: 
!) verification that a design meets requirements 
2) validity of the processes that create the design 
definition 
3) validity of the processes that produce the system 
4) validity of the tools that verify the design 
5) control of the design definition 
6) control of product manufacturing, assembly, 
inspection and testing 
7) verification of the CTS operational capability 
2.1 The Design Element 
The design element of Certification is a broad term to 
encompass many design activities and processes that 
allow NASA to approve the use of a system. 
Certification can only occur after establishment of a 
design baseline post-CDR, and after all analysis and 
qualification testing have been completed, including all 
modifications needed for qualification-caused 
corrective actions. An item built to the design definition 
and intended for testing to verify a requirement is often 
called a qualification article. Similarly, a test 
performed on a qualification article is often called a 
qualification test. 
2.1.1 Verification that a Design Meets Requirements 
Verification methods include test, analysis, inspection, 
demonstration or combinations of these methods. To 
establish that a design meets requirements, verification 
methods are determined, planned and conducted, and 
results are assessed. A system is characterized by a 
product breakdown structure (PBS), with example PBS 
levels being "system-element-modules-subsystem-
units-component." Verification is conducted at the 
levels of the PBS necessary to satisfy the applicable 
requirements. A set of requirements contain individual 
requirements written at different levels of the PBS, such 
as system requirements for integrated performance and 
subsystem requirements for specific functional 
performance of a subsystem. Requirements are 
allocated down by the providing organization to the 
lowest level necessary in the PBS to accomplish a 
function or meet an objective. Requirements derived 
from hazard analyses as hazard controls are considered 
program level derived requirements and are expected to 
be treated like program level specified requirements 
within the Provider's Certification. These controls are 
implemented in design, production, and operations. 
Verifications are performed at the allocated level and as 
necessary at the next higher assembly level. The 
verifications at the higher assembly level may be 
analysis of the integrated performance at that level 
based on the results of verification at the level below. 
Verification of the allocated requirement is rolled up to 
prove that the system meets the requirement. To support 
the roll up of verifications at the top level of the PBS, 
data products at the lowest level of allocated 
performance are identified and are available to support 
Certification. 
Verification that a design meets requirements includes 
any necessary functionality and performance during 
exposure to environmental conditions (e.g., vibration, 
temperature, pressure) that the item will be subject to 
during all phases of the service life. The service life 
extends from the completion of fabrication to final 
disposal of the item and includes all acceptance test 
environments, handling, transportation, storage, ground 
operations, flight, and recovery. Qualification testing is 
generally conducted with margin beyond the design 
specification required conditions with respect to 
amplitudes, cycles, or duration of exposure. This type 
of testing is done to account for unit-to-unit variability 
in the flight production hardware, to justify allowable 
test tolerances, and to demonstrate an overall robustness 
of the design to withstand the environmental conditions 
expected throughout the service life. The item is 
qualified with margin beyond the specification required 
conditions in order to certify the design to the 
specification required conditions. 
ln order for verification to be valid, it must be 
conducted on an article or model representative of the 
design to be certified. To verify a requirement by test, 
the test must be conducted on an item that has been 
produced in accordance with the design definition for 
those attributes where test results would be used as 
verification evidence. ln addition, the test equipment or 
facility must be shown to be capable of conducting a 
test that exposes the item under test to the conditions 
necessary to simulate the environment and measure the 
results. To verify a requirement by analysis, the analysis 
must be conducted on an item that represents the design 
attributes being analyzed and with valid results. 
2.1.2 Validity of the Processes that Create the 
Design Definition 
The design definition includes extensive information 
produced to document the design, such as drawings, 
manufacturing models, analysis models, interface 
models, assembly procedures, special process 
instructions, specification sheets for parts or materials, 
and sampling procedures. The processes used to create 
these individual information products must be credible 
and repeatable. 
In addition to the tools that produce the design 
defmition, the establishment of consistent use of source 
data and use of that source data within different design 
definition articles must be understood. CAD and 
mathematical models used to define, produce and 
analyze the design must be consistent with the design 
source data. If the material property is changed in the 
CAD model or production plan, the analysis must be 
changed to account for the different material property 
and re-run to determine that the design still meets the 
requirements. 
2.1.3 Validity of the Processes that Produce the 
System 
When the processes used to produce the end item do not 
maintain the production process in accordance with the 
intent of the design definition, the product may not 
represent the design. Processes that produce the system 
may impart unintended stresses or flaws in the product 
that will not be detected by inspection and test. 
Understanding the capability, repeatability and 
weaknesses in the processes that produce the end item 
allows the design, manufacturing and test organization 
to establish the test, inspection and sampling 
requirements that have the best opportunity to identify 
and prevent flaws. The processes that produce the 
system must be capable of producing products that meet 
the tolerances and critical attributes in the design 
definition and must account for additional factors such 
as material selection and control; mechanical and 
electrical parts management processes; metrology and 
tool calibration; limited life identification and tracking; 
separation of flight and non-flight stock; control of 
flight hardware from unauthorized and un-recorded 
activities that could damage or remove cycle life. 
When a system contains items that are re-used or 
refurbished, additional processes are necessary. In 
addition to the processes that produced the system, 
additional processes are established to ensure that the 
item is capable of performing an additional mission. 
2.1.4 Validity of the Tools that Verify the Design 
To verify a requirement by test, the test must be 
conducted on an item that has been produced in 
accordance with the design defmition for those 
attributes where test results would be used as 
verification evidence. Flight and ground test, with 
appropriate instrumentation, are typically needed to 
validate environments, functionality, system 
performance, and margins. 
2.1.5 Control of the Design Definition 
Management systems that define and control 
implementation processes are necessary to certify that 
produced products are understood, and are 
representative of the design. They describe the 
organizational structure, along with roles, 
responsibilities and relationships for managing systems 
engineering processes and tools. Relevant sub-tier 
plans address processes control of critical functions 
including quality management, procurement quality, 
configuration management, material control, 
requirements management, risk management. 
Configuration control is key to defining hardware and 
software configuration from baselining of all products 
at initial release of the Product Breakdown Structure 
(PBS) to completion of final Certification. 
Configuration control is key to ensuring that the correct 
system is built, and that improper substitutions are not 
made. Configuration control of training and operational 
products used to operate the hardware and software is 
also necessary to ensure that the system is not operated 
out of its certified design range. · 
The design definition must be controlled to understand 
changes that are made and the impact to the 
certification. Design drawings must be controlled so 
that a change to a drawing that affects the form, fit, or 
function of that item or its production process is given a 
different designation (such as a different dash number 
or configuration item identifier) from the original 
drawing (part) number. Any change to the material 
property in any of the design definition must be 
controlled so that the change is properly accounted for 
in all design definition and the impact of change is 
understood and agreeable by the affected functional 
disciplines. 
2.2 The Production Element 
Production certification is the confirmation that a 
Provider's production process will result in properly 
integrated "as-built" elements of the system that match 
the overall physical CTS design or "print." This 
confirmation assures the elements will meet the 
performance, safety, reliability, and quality 
requirements established and verified at the functional 
level. The scope of this element of the CTS 
Certification applies to the hardware and software 
associated with production tooling, test equipment, 
qualification article(s), flight test articles, and all 
production articles. Certification of personnel and 
processes used to create the production articles are also 
included in the scope. Since the production processes 
derived for the qualification and first flight articles 
apply to all articles produced with the scope of this 
element of Certification. 
The Provider's production certification emphasis will 
be on production and assembly processes that 
implement critical attributes; failure tolerance, 
redundancy and hazard controls; and the tests, analyses, 
demonstrations, and/or inspections supporting the 
verification of the as-built CTS. 
Certification of the system and ability to endorse flight 
readiness relies on knowing that the products produced 
and identified by that certified configuration are 
controlled. The basis of why certification was granted 
can be affected by manufacturing and special process 
changes; changes to assembly procedures, which 
include criticaJ processes; and inspection and testing, 
which have been identified as part of the design 
certification. Lessons learned from past programs have 
highlighted areas where deficiencies in control and 
screening of hardware resulted in erosion of design 
margins to the point offailure. 
Production critical planning, processes, and inspections, 
utilized to manufacture flight articles or maintain 
reusable elements must be compatible with the 
Provider's hardware and software design and 
producibility definition. The production system will 
include a quality management system that meets the 
intent of AS9100. During manufacturing, despite best 
efforts in production Certification and process control, 
there will inevitably be unplanned deltas between the 
"as-designed" and "as-built" hardware or software 
elements. These departures will need to be eliminated 
through rework or ultimately deemed acceptable. 
Dispositions to non-conformances typically involve 
either rework intended to return hardware to print, 
and/or accepting changes to the "as-designed" 
configuration of the hardware, following review and 
evaluation. These resolutions often involve exceptions 
to approved designs or production processes, which are 
documented through a Provider approved Material 
Review Board (MRB) and/or waiver/deviation process. 
FUrthermore, non-conformance resolutions must 
continue to comply with management process 
requirements for maintaining accurate records of the 
"as-built" CTS configuration, and for maintaining 
appropriate levels of production traceability. 
A key component of production control is product 
acceptance by the Provider. Product acceptance is the 
verification activity that demonstrates that each flight-
item produced performs in accordance with 
requirements and has been fabricated with acceptable 
quality and workmanship. Formal acceptance test 
begins at the unit level of assembly and progresses 
through higher levels of assembly as appropriate up to 
the final highest level of integrated assembly. 
2.3 The Operational Element 
CTS Certification includes the confirmation that 
operational plans, processes, procedures, and 
operational support systems are consistent with the 
design of the flight elements and will result in 
operations which meet mission requirements, while 
remaining within the constraints established by the 
verified and validated capabilities of hardware, 
software, and humans involved. Processes defined for 
operational authority, such as risk acceptance, material 
reviews, deviations and waivers, etc. should be included 
in operational Certification. 
Early in the design phase, operational concepts are 
developed by the Provider which influences the design 
of flight systems and ground architecture. As these 
design elements mature, so do the operational concepts. 
NASA expects the Provider to document these maturing 
operational concepts and architectures in periodically 
updated operations concepts documents and in baseline 
operations plans, which describe the operational support 
facilities, personnel performing operations in those 
facilities, and mechanisms to define and control 
operational processes. 
Operations facilities are reviewed to assure that mission 
critical infrastructure can support the missions and 
interface with external operational facilities such as the 
ISS ITilSSIOn control center, Eastern Range, 
STRA TCOM, etc. 
3. NASA ROLE IN CTS CERTIFICATION 
Traditionally, the NASA approach to certify and accept 
human spaceflight systems was to provide sufficient 
resources to engage in complete oversight of the 
requirements, Design, Development, Testing, and 
Evaluation (DDT&E) phases. This included full 
participation and oversight in the development and 
operations of the system. The Government employed 
an integral process review that enabled direct 
participation and direction by NASA of the design 
along with its trades and analyses used to drive the 
design configuration and verification program. 
Independent assessments, modeling and testing rounded 
out this resource intensive model of engagement in the 
design certification of the hardware and software. This 
ensured the Government had detailed knowledge of the 
design and the design performance, and provided 
direction to resolving issues identified during this 
phase. Established resident office personnel augmented 
the knowledge gathering of the manufacturing and 
production phases. Full accountability of ownership of 
the design and the system were vested in the 
Government at acceptance and transfer of 
accountability of the system. Additionally, the 
Government was responsible for system operation. 
With the acquisition strategy implemented by CCP, the 
Government will neither own the CTS design nor the 
CTS hardware/software, nor assume operation of the 
system. CCP will rely more on the Provider to perform 
the detailed tasks of Certification. The level of 
knowledge of the CTS required by CCP is modified 
from the traditional approach, enabling efficiencies to 
be realized in development and certification phases. 
CCP will implement a risk-based engagement approach 
with reduced NASA involvement to substantiate the 
Provider assertion of Certification. 
Factors used to focus this engagement are dominated by 
two arenas-those that are unique to the Provider and 
those that are driven by vehicle architecture. Unique 
characteristics of the Provider are reflected in its 
program management plans; maturity and control of 
standards and processes; resources available for peer 
review and checks and balances; and depth of 
experience and skill in critical functional areas. Factors 
driven by vehicle architecture are reflected in 
functionally critical systems, high-energy or high-risk 
systems, maturity technology readiness levels (TRL), 
complexity and robustness of design and hazard 
controls driven by safety. 
3.1 Certification, Verification And Validation Plan 
Review Task 
NASA will review the certification plan to assure it 
captures the processes to be used and activities to 
demonstrate the CTS can be certified. In order for this 
plan to be accepted it must contain: 
1) A summary level ofCTS configuration with its 
PBS planned for certification, and a description of 
each reference mission for which it is being 
certified. 
2) Schedule of certification activities, including 
critical path, certification milestones, and events 
within the schedule. 
3) Strategy for certifying flight hardware, flight and 
ground hardware/software including qualification 
of design, acceptance of flight systems, and 
mission ope~ations capabilities. 
4) Identification of physical resources (facilities, 
software, and simulators/mock ups, and personnel 
for human-system performance testing) required to 
perform the verification and validation activities. 
5) Descriptions of the contents of hardware and 
software qualification reports, hardware and 
software acceptance reports, verification and 
validation reports. 
6) Description of the products that provide evidence 
for NASA confmnation of manufacturing, 
operations, hardware and software qualification 
and acceptance test programs, environmental 
testing, and for validation of models and 
simulations used throughout the life cycle for 
making critical decisions that may impact human 
safety. 
7) List of content to be delivered in the Certification 
Data Packages. 
8) Understand and accept residual risk due to hazards, 
waivers, non-compliances, etc. 
NASA will review the Verfication and Validation 
(V&V) Plan, its activities, methods, products, and 
processes that develop the evidence that all 
requirements are met: 
1) Detailed description of the verification and 
validation activities to be performed. 
2) Descriptions of the documentation and products to 
be delivered to support verification compliance 
report closures. 
3) Manufacturing and operations verification and 
validation plans that include hazard controls 
implemented. 
Once these plans are accepted, compliance will be 
monitored and surveyed throughout the design and 
de"elopment phases using NASA Engineering and 
Quality insight, with emphasis on potential high risk 
areas. 
3.2 Approval of Alternate Standards 
NASA has identified a set of standards for design, 
production, and operations that represent proven 
techniques for achieving safe, reliable spaceflight. 
Alternate standards will be evaluated by the 
responsible technical authority for its ability to meet or 
exceed the intent of the NASA designated standard. A 
formal approval process will be used to determine the 
suitability of these alternate standards to show they 
meet the acceptance criteria. When approved by NASA, 
these standards become the standards by which design, 
production, and operations products are measured and 
assessed by NASA. 
33 Assessment of Management and Process Control 
CCP will review Provider's plans to assess capabilities 
to manage requirements; perform peer reviews; enable 
robust checks and balances; manage change and process 
control; implement quality systems in procurement and 
production; control non-conforming hardware; and 
manage elements of risk. Initial assessments and 
acceptance will be reviewed during major milestone 
reviews with monitoring for compliance performed 
throughout the life cycle. 
3.4 Assessment of Hazard Reports 
NASA will review the Provider's hazard analysis 
results to assure all potential hazards and hazard causes 
associated with the CTS have been identified, 
adequately assessed (qualitatively and quantitatively), 
and that sufficient controls have been implemented to 
mitigate each hazard cause. Expectations regarding the 
Provider's hazard analyses include the following: 
1) A description of the hazard analysis methodology 
used by the Provider and how hazard analysis 
results are used to influence the integrated CTS 
design, production, and operations. 
2) Hazard analysis results including a description of 
all potential hazards, hazard causes, controls and 
crew survival capabilities, and a risk assessment of 
each hazard cause (consequence and likelihood). 
3) A closed loop system for tracking implementation 
and verification of each hazard control and crew 
survival capability identified in the hazard analysis. 
4) A process for evaluating CTS 
performance/anomalies, design and operational 
changes for impacts to hazard controls and 
associated risks. 
The NASA Technical Authorities will review results of 
the Provider's hazard analyses for completeness and 
acceptability of residual risks, and make an acceptance 
recommendation to the CCP program manager. NASA 
will be responsible for formal approval of the Provider 
hazard analyses, and acceptance .of the identified 
residual risk. 
3.5 Operational Plans 
NASA will review the operational plans to assure it 
captures the processes to be used and activities to 
demonstrate the CTS can be certified. In order for this 
plan to be accepted it must contain: 
I) What plans and products are required from all CTS 
elements to prepare or certify readiness for the 
mission. 
2) Plans for implementing the entire operations 
sequence, including production, processing, 
scheduling, assembly/integration/test, launch 
preparation, launch countdown and ascent, on-orbit 
mission execution, and reentry and recovery. 
3) Evidence that integrated space vehicle and facilities 
are operated within design limits. 
4) Include personnel training plans, personnel 
workload plans, a ground processing plan for 
launch preparation, a flight plan for launch 
countdown and mission execution, and abort plans 
for all mission phases. 
3. 7 Monitoring of Elements of Design, Development, 
Testing and Evaluation (DDT&E) 
NASA will use a proactive approach to assess critical 
elements of the DDT &E phases by maintaining a 
continuous vigilance of the Provider activities to mature 
the system. Provider planned periodic exchanges of 
information with the design teams enable NASA's 
timely recognition of issues involving safety features 
and reliability concerns that warrant changes while 
minimizing costly modifications later in the process. 
NASA will participate in testing activities (test plans, 
test procedures, test readiness reviews, and the test) for 
high risk items. 
3.8 Substantiation of CTS Certification 
CCP's substantiation process includes all of the above 
tasks performed over the duration of the DDT &E 
phases of the program. Some of these tasks are two 
stages (e.g. an approval of a Provider's plan followed 
by a verification of compliance with that plan). Others 
are a less formal activity such as monitoring the process 
for decisions that define the design, production and 
operations. These less formal processes allow for early 
detection of problems and to elevate these residual risks 
for technical or management resolution. Success is 
measured against the criteria documented in the CCP 
requirements and plans. 
4. NASA ENGAGEMENT IN ASSESSMENT OF 
PROVIDER CERTIFICATION 
CCP implementation of the certification strategy 
outlined in this section is a proactive approach 
employing a risk-based method to allocating technical 
resources and engaging with industry in performing 
NASA Certification compliance assessments. The 
implementation of this certification strategy defines the 
approach to technical evaluation of development and 
verification activities to obtain confidence that NASA 
Certification requirements are being adequately 
implemented and verified. The primary responsibility 
within CCP for this assurance is delegated to the 
program Systems Engineering & Integration (SE&I) 
and systems offices. The Office of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) and Subject Matter Expert, in 
coordination with the Certification Deputy Manager and 
Partner Manager, define the depth and level of this 
penetration within the Partner Integration Team (PIT). 
The SE&I and systems offices, consistent with their 
OPR assignments, are responsible for assessing 
compliance to the program requirements. The PIT is 
responsible for executing the processes outlined within 
this section in close coordination with the industry 
partner. 
Initially, the PIT will determine the allocation of 
resources and insight assessment priorities at the outset 
of each phase of the program using the guidelines 
described in this section. The SE&I and systems offices 
are responsible for ensuring that the resources across 
the PIT are balanced and commensurate with the 
assessed risk. The insight assessment will be a 
continuous activity throughout each phase of the 
program and will be adjusted as necessary to fit the 
observations of the PIT assigned to each partner. As 
technical issues and challenges arise, the adjustments 
will be accomplished through collaboration between the 
appropriate representatives on the PIT. 
Certification compliance assessments will be 
documented and maintained through the life of the 
program by the Certification Deputy Manager. These 
assessments will reflect the level and depth of 
penetration achieved through the process outlined 
above. The two components of NASA endorsement to 
Certification are completion of the risk-based 
Certification approach described herein and the closure 
or acceptance of risks. 
4.1 Provider Factors Driving NASA Engagement 
Strategy 
Factors that influence the Provider's ability to provide a 
rooust transportation service include: management and 
control processes; skill set and experience level in 
critical functional disciplines; depth in staffing to 
provide adequate peer review; a strong in-house process 
of checks and balances across the DDT &E phases; and 
an effective independent assessment support function. 
CCP PITs for each Provider will develop knowledge of 
the capabilities, processes, and risks to align insight 
resources for optimum support to the Provider as well 
as knowledge capture relative to the NASA 
Certification. 
How well a Provider implements these features in their 
organizational structure must be a critical factor in 
determining NASA resource engagements. Active 
participation by the NASA team adds value through 
early identification of risks and enables opportunities 
for more cost effective mitigations. 
The PIT role is critical in understanding and assessing 
the Provider's CTS and its Certification. Insight 
acquired by the PIT is the mechanism by which CCP 
collects data to support substantiation of the Provider's 
assertion of Certification. 
PIT members and their supporting technical discipline 
leads are assumed to have access to Provider's 
supporting information. Whenever feasible, they will 
also be included in the Provider' s coordination and/or, 
planning forums, readiness reviews, design reviews, 
engineering boards, simulation reviews and briefings, 
test reviews and briefings, and hardware or operational 
demonstrations to gain proper insight penetration. The 
PIT's focus is on activities and practices that support 
CTS Certification. 
Examples of material that PIT members will have 
access to as part of insight: 
1) Products demonstrating closure of NASA 
verification requirements. 
2) Provider standards for design, development, 
production, manufacturing, operations, training, 
and other relevant standards. 
3) Testing and analyses supporting development, 
qualification, and acceptance of vehicle 
hardware/software. 
4) Modeling and test article fabrication . 
5) Hazard analysis and reports with mitigation plans, 
requirements, controls, and results. 
6) Processes for communication and management of 
flight safety risk. 
7) Products associated with Provider identified risks 
and mitigation plans, requirements, controls, and 
results. 
8) Products associated with internal and independent 
verification and validation. 
9) Project manufacturing and development. 
10) Waivers and deviations. 
4.4 Oversight in Certification 
Oversight in the CCP context means the acceptance of 
the Certification information provided by the Providers 
as evidence of compliance to the requirements. System 
office personnel are embedded in the PITs to facilitate 
successful certification and simultaneously review 
formally submitted documentation for approval. NASA 
will execute this acceptance through the approval of 
specific information outlined in the approved 
certification plans for each Provider. 
CCP approval is under the authority of the Program 
Control Board (PCB) as delegated from the agency. The 
PCB has delegated limited authority for the approval of 
technical products to the Technical Review Board 
(TRB). Certification plans and delivered certification 
products will be approved by the designated boards 
after review by program, technical authorities, and 
flight crew office. In addition, the completion of 
specified milestones will be approved by the program 
boards by reviewing a summary of the evidence 
provided against the entrance and exit criteria 
established in the contracted Certification plan. 
The compliance with safety requirements is formally 
executed as a subset of CTS Certification. NASA 
accomplishes this primarily though insight into the 
decisions affecting safety and engagement of the 
technical community in decisions affecting risk, and 
through delivered hazard reports. Safety risks, 
documented on hazard reports, will be approved by 
NASA in the program boards as the hazard mitigation 
process is performed. NASA approval means that 
NASA understands and accepts the risk documented on 
the report. 
5. GRANTING CERTIFICATION 
Certification will be granted when the Provider has 
shown that they have completed the Certification Plan 
and NASA substantiates the Provider's assertion of 
certification. Recommendations for certification will be 
reviewed through the CCP PCB, the Joint (CCP and ISS 
Program) Program Requirements Control Board 
(JP.RCB), and finally through NASAIHQ to the NASA 
AA. It is anticipated that the recommendation for 
certification to the NASA AA will be done upon 
completion of activities associated with the OCR 
milestone prior to launch. The Provider will perform 
and show verification satisfaction for requirements. The 
Provider will also show the agreed-to standards and an 
established set of project processes have been followed. 
NASA will perform independent verification and/or 
validation in some critical areas and of critical models 
to gain confidence in the Provider. Validation testing 
agreed to by both NASA and the Provider will be 
completed to buy down risk. As evidence for review by 
the NASA AA, CCP will develop a set of 
recommendations (see CCT-PLN-2000) that will show 
the certification elements have been met. For missions 
to ISS, the ISS Program will provide a recommendation 
to the NASA AA on the completion of the ISS 
Integration Process. Certification of the CTS for use in 
transporting NASA crew in accordance with the ISS 
DRM is granted by the NASA AA. 
6. CERTIFICATION MAINTENANCE 
After NASA has granted Certification of the CTS for 
the first crewed flight to LEO, NASA will continue 
monitoring the Provider's execution of processes 
described by this paper with the focus shifting to 
evaluation of changes to the design, production, and 
operational baseline established in the original 
certification. In addition, continued operation of the 
system may expose unforeseen risks through post-flight 
reconstruction, production failures, obsolescence, or in-
flight anomalies. NASA will not assume the 
responsibility for baseline maintenance of the 
certification but will be involved through insight in the 
assessment of changes. When changes are deemed to 
affect the baseline established at certification, NASA 
will assess and potentially re-grant certification of 
affected systems. Key tenets of insight focus on the 
following areas: 
1) All design modifications will be assessed for 
compliance with Certification requirements. 
2) Expansion of operating limits previously certified 
for the system. 
3) Non-conformance/anomaly reviews during 
production and operations. 
4) In-flight anomalies. 
5) Pre-flight assessments. 
6) Post-flight reconstruction. 
7) Audits will be conducted in key areas such as: 
a. Adherence to design and construction 
standards. 
b. Adherence to operational requirements. 
c. CM and quality audits of production 
operations. 
8) Close-calls and mishaps program will be 
maintained. 
Certification maintenance is the responsibility of the 
Provider. Significant deficiencies or changes identified 
through insight or formal audit activities could result in 
the revocation of the Provider's certification if not 
addressed by the Provider; therefore, it is in the best 
interest of the Provider to establish and execute 
repeatable and reliable processes throughout the life of 
the system. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The CCP approach to assuring crew and personnel 
safety is a combination of CTS Certification to an 
established set of safety requirements and incremental 
acceptance of risk by the Provider, NASA, and 
ultimately the user. Risk is identified, managed, and 
controlled through defmed safety analyses. The 
residual risk of the CTS is initially accepted through the 
certification and is managed through proactive 
maintenance of this certification. CTS Certification 
consists of three elements: design, production, and 
operations Certification. Certification of each of these 
elements is described as a three step process comprised 
of the Provider developing a CTS that they assert will 
meet NASA's safety and technical requirements, NASA 
substantiation of the Provider assertion, and NASA 
granting Certification. The paper describes the 
elements that comprise certification and focuses on 
what must be done by the Provider to achieve 
certification and by NASA to grant Certification. The 
traditional NASA approach to certify and accept human 
spaceflight systems was to provide sufficient resources 
to engage in complete oversight of the DDT&E phases. 
With the acquisition strategy implemented by CCP, the 
Government will neither own the CTS design nor the 
CTS hardware/software, nor assume operation of the 
system. As described, CCP will implement a risk-based 
engagement approach with reduced NASA involvement 
to substantiate the Provider assertion of certification. 
Factors used to focus this engagement are dominated by 
two arenas-those that are unique to the Provider and 
those that are driven by vehicle architecture 
